When can quantum information be localized to each of a collection of spacetime regions, while also excluded from another collection of regions? We answer this question by defining and analyzing the localize-exclude task, in which a state must be localized to a collection of authorized regions while also being excluded from a set of unauthorized regions. This task is a spacetime analogue of quantum secret sharing, with authorized and unauthorized regions replacing authorized and unauthorized sets of parties. Our analysis yields the first quantum secret sharing scheme for arbitrary access structures for which the number of qubits required scales polynomially with the number of parties. We also study a second related task called state-assembly, in which shares of a quantum state are requested at sets of spacetime points. We fully characterize the conditions under which both the localizeexclude and state-assembly tasks can be achieved, and give explicit protocols. Finally, we propose a cryptographic application of these tasks which we call party-independent transfer.
Introduction
The study of the interplay between quantum theory and relativity has recently begun a new chapter with the consideration of quantum information tasks in a Minkowski space background [1, 2, 3] . For instance, the study of information causality [4] and of causal operators [5] has given further insight into ties between information processing and relativity. Along with other results in this area [6, 7, 8, 9] , these can be placed into the general framework of quantum tasks in Minkowski space [10] .
One task of particular interest is summoning, defined by Kent [11] , where the associated no-summoning theorem is a statement of no-cloning appropriate to the spacetime setting. We have also argued that a generalization of the summoning task [6] provides an operational framework within which to study how quantum information can move through spacetime. The importance of having such a framework is highlighted by recent subtle questions concerning spacetime structure and the no-cloning principle in the context of black holes [12, 13] . Understanding how a quantum state may be delocalized in Minkowski space should be a useful step towards understanding such fundamental puzzles.
The study of quantum tasks in Minkowski space has been given a second motivation with the discovery of cryptographic protocols that exploit the properties of either or both of quantum mechanics and special relativity. Bit-commitment is a well-known example [14, 15] ; other examples include coin flipping [16] , key distribution (which has purely quantum but also purely relativistic implementations [17, 18] ), and two spacetime analogues of oblivious Figure 1 : An example of a localize-exclude task. A single copy of an unknown quantum state is initially localized near the spacetime point s, and needs to be localized to within regions A 1 and A 2 , while avoiding region U 1 . Theorem 4 shows that this is possible to do. transfer dubbed location-oblivious transfer [19] and spacetime-constrained oblivious transfer [20] .
In quantum secret sharing, a central result of quantum cryptography, a state is distributed among many parties such that only certain subsets of parties may collectively use their shares to reconstruct the quantum state. Other subsets of parties are required to not be able to learn any information about the secret from their shares. In the context of quantum tasks in Minkowski space, where the movement of information in spacetime is central, and in the context of relativistic quantum cryptography, it is natural to consider a spacetime generalization of quantum secret sharing.
To do this we replace the notions of authorized and unauthorized collections of parties with authorized and unauthorized spacetime regions. We define the localize-exclude task, where the goal is to move a quantum state through spacetime in such a way that it is reproduced in each of the authorized regions and excluded from the unauthorized ones. Figure 1 gives a simple example.
In this article we define a state to be localized to a spacetime region Σ if some party, call him Bob, who has been given unrestricted access to that spacetime region can reconstruct the state. For instance, we can imagine a Bob who is given access to a certain quantum information processing laboratory between two specified times. If this Bob is able to reconstruct the state from his laboratory visit, potentially by making use of data processing that occurs elsewhere, then we say the state is localized there. Otherwise the state is said to be excluded from that region. Figure 2 : Four impossible localize-exclude tasks: (a) An authorized region is entirely outside the future light cone of s, so can't be localized there without violating the no-signalling principle. (b) The initial location of the quantum state is in the domain of dependence of an unauthorized region U 1 , so can be reconstructed from data in U 1 . (c) A quantum state cannot be localized to both the spacetime regions A 1 and A 2 , due to the no-cloning theorem. (d) A quantum state cannot be localized to A 1 without passing through the region U 1 , since there is no causal curve which passes through A 1 and not U 1 . The red shaded region indicates the domain of dependence of the unauthorized region U 1 . The yellow shading indicates the future light cone of the start point.
As an initial approach to understanding the associated task, called localize-exclude, we can list off the most basic restrictions that we expect to apply. First, the initial location of the state should be sensible in two ways: it shouldn't be so far away that the authorized regions are outside its future light cone, and it shouldn't be inside the domain of dependence of any unauthorized region. We can also see that there should be conditions on the relative positions of the authorized and unauthorized regions. In particular, if there are two regions which are causally disconnected then it won't be possible to localize the state to both of them. This is a simple consequence of the no-cloning theorem. Additionally, we can never have an authorized region A i be contained in the domain of dependence of an unauthorized region U j , since then it is impossible to localize the state to A i without also localizing it to U j . We illustrate these conditions in figure 2 .
Remarkably, given a collection of spacetime regions A 1 , A 2 ...A n to which we would like to localize a state and a collection of regions U 1 , U 2 , ...U n which we would like to avoid, we will be able to complete the localize-exclude task so long as none of the four situations in figure 2 occur. We state this more precisely as the following theorem, proven and discussed in detail in the main text. Theorem 2 Given a collection of authorized regions {A i } and unauthorized regions {U i }, a localize-exclude task is possible if and only if the following three conditions are satisfied.
(i) The starting location of the state ρ (a) has at least one point from each authorized region in its causal future, and (b) is not in the domain of dependence of any unauthorized region. (ii) Every pair of authorized regions (A i , A j ) is causally connected. (iii) For every pair (A i , U j ) of authorized and unauthorized regions, A i is not contained in the domain of dependence of U j .
To argue that the localize-exclude task is a natural spacetime generalization of secret sharing, we show in the main text that there is a simple construction that embeds any quantum secret sharing scheme as a localize-exclude task, and that the conditions of this theorem reduce to those for quantum secret sharing in that case. At this point, we can already note the similarity of conditions (ii) and (iii) to the corresponding monotonicity and no-cloning requirements of quantum secret sharing [21] .
In the summoning task one party, Bob, puts in requests for the state at certain spacetime points, asking that the state be returned at one of another set of points. The localize-exclude task removes this structure, but adds a notion of unauthorized region. It is interesting to also consider a task in the request-return setting, but which also includes unauthorized regions. In this state-assembly, we consider many parties Bob i who may each request a share of the quantum state at an associated spacetime region D i . Alice should respond to the collection of requests given by the Bobs in a careful way: she should hand over a collection of shares sufficient to construct a single copy of the state when the collection of requests is authorized, and she should not reveal any information about the state when that collection is unauthorized. The conditions for Alice to complete this task are the same as for localize-exclude in the case of causally separated regions, but will differ when non-trivial causal structures are considered. We precisely characterize the conditions under which this task can be completed, in addition to describing an explicit protocol.
Together, the state-assembly and localize-exclude tasks provide a rich set of scenarios to consider. We suggest party-independent transfer as a potential cryptographic application of this framework, a task where two other parties wish to receive information from Alice and want the information they receive to be both private and independent of their identity. We propose a protocol for completing this task which is built on the state-assembly task. Establishing the security of this protocol we leave to future work.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives the necessary definitions to study localization to arbitrary spacetime regions and proves theorem 4. We discuss the relation between localize-exclude and quantum secret sharing in the same section. In section 3 we discuss state-assembly and give its characterization. In section 4 we study the partyindependent transfer task. Two appendices are included which clarify the relationship of this work to earlier work on summoning. The first shows that state-assembly is equivalent to a certain summoning task, and the second addresses the points raised by Adlam in Kent [7] against interpreting summoning tasks in terms of the localization of information.
Localizing and excluding quantum information

Localizing quantum information to many regions
As a first step towards theorem 4, we discuss the problem of localizing quantum information to a collection of spacetime regions. To do this, we consider the following setting. Alice holds a quantum state, which is recorded in a collection of classical and quantum systems held within secure laboratories not accessible to her adversary, Bob ‡. We would like to ask where Alice's state is. For instance, Alice might have recorded her state into an error-correcting code and distributed the shares of this code to various laboratories. Further, she might be constantly rerouting these shares between labs, so that shares are held only at certain labs between specified times.
We can ask where the quantum state is in spacetime by temporarily relaxing the security of Alice's labs -we give Bob access to some collection of Alice's labs for certain time intervals. If by accessing these labs Bob is able to prepare the quantum state (potentially making use of later data processing), we say that state was localized to the collection of labs and intervals of time Bob accessed. More generally, we can abstract away from the language of labs and time intervals and give a somewhat more general definition.
Definition 1 Suppose one party, Alice, holds a quantum state ρ. Then we say the state ρ is localized to a spacetime region Σ if a second party, Bob, for whom the state is initially unknown and who is given access to only the region Σ is able to prepare the state ρ. ‡ Alice and Bob are both agencies, who have many agents that may be distributed to many different laboratories.
Conversely, if Bob is unable to learn anything about the state ρ we say the state is excluded from Σ.
To be more precise we should specify how it is verified that Bob indeed holds the state ρ after he has accessed Σ. One natural possibility is to introduce a third party, call him Charlie, who knows the density matrix ρ that Alice initially holds (though Alice may not). After Bob accesses Σ and perhaps performs some information processing in his own lab, Bob returns a density matrix ρ to Charlie. Charlie then tests if ρ = ρ. After repeating this trial many times, we may conclude whether or not Bob is able to determine ρ by accessing Σ.
One strategy for hiding a quantum state from Bob would be for Alice to send ρ into a region Σ, while also sending various decoy states ρ d1 , ρ d2 , ... so that Bob, though he may collect all of the states ρ, ρ d1 , ρ d2 , ... is left unsure as to which density matrix to hand to Charlie. This reveals a finer point to our definition 1: a system holding the state Bob is searching for may enter Σ, but if appropriate classical instructions do not also enter Σ (in this case a label denoting which system actually holds ρ), then definition 1 says the state is not localized there.
To avoid confusion around this point we will always have Alice, at some early time, reveal the classical instructions that constitute her protocol to Bob. The only information Alice will not broadcast is a classical string k (as well as the quantum state itself). As we will see, protocols where Alice holds only a secret key k and reveals all other details to Bob are sufficient to complete any physically possible localize-exclude task, so this restriction on Alice amounts to a useful simplification of notation and language.
In the protocols we construct Alice will encode her quantum state into an error correcting code that corrects erasure errors, and then apply a quantum one-time pad to each of the shares in the quantum code. Alice does not broadcast the classical strings used in the one-time pads; taken together these constitute her secret key k. However, she does reveal her procedure for putting ρ into an error correcting code and applying the one-time pad, and reveals the spacetime trajectories of each share in the code. Within this context, Bob reconstructs the state ρ by accessing a region Σ whenever a correctable subset of shares in the error correcting code along with their corresponding classical keys from the the one-time pad pass through Σ.
With this definition of localization in hand, we now turn to understanding under which circumstances Alice can localize a state to a collection of regions. To this end we define the following localization task. Alice holds an unknown quantum state ρ which is initially localized near a certain point, call it the start point s. Alice and Bob share knowledge of a collection of regions {A i }. Bob will access exactly one of the regions A i , with i chosen at random. Alice will try to localize the state to each region A i , which we call the authorized regions, so that Bob's access always results in him preparing a copy of the state. If Alice is able to complete this task with a perfect success rate we say she is able to localize the state to all of the regions {A i }.
To analyze this task it is useful to introduce some language. First, we make the following definition which specifies a relation between pairs of spacetime regions. Figure 3 : An arrangement of two authorized regions that has the minimal requirements to localize a state to both. By assumption A 1 and A 2 are causally connected. This guarantees the existence of a point p 1 in A 1 which is in the causal future of some point p 2 in A 2 (up to relabelling). The conditions of the theorem also require that each region have at least one point in the future light cone of s. However, the regions A 1 and A 2 may be disconnected (as shown here) and so satisfy this requirement while having the points p 1 , p 2 be outside the future light cone of s. To localize to both regions, a maximally entangled state |Ψ EĒ is shared between s and p 1 . Near to s the state is teleported using this entanglement, and the entangled system at p 1 is sent to p 2 . Meanwhile, the classical measurement outcomes from the teleportation protocol are sent to the points in A 1 and A 2 which are in the causal future of s. Each region has both the classical measurement outcomes and the entangled particle pass through it, so the state is localized to each.
Definition 2 Two spacetime regions Σ i and Σ j are said to be causally connected if there is a point in Σ i which is in the causal future of some point in Σ j , or vice versa.
We now prove the following theorem regarding localization of a quantum state to a collection of spacetime regions, which shows in particular that it is only causal connections between pairs of regions that are needed to complete the task. Proof. First, note that if an authorized region is entirely outside the future light cone of the start point, then successfully localizing the state to that region would constitute superluminal communication. Thus, the first condition is necessary. To see necessity of the second condition, suppose that there existed an arrangement of regions containing an A 1 and A 2 which are causally disconnected, along with a protocol for successfully completing the task. Then it is possible to construct the state by accessing the region A 1 , and by accessing A 2 . By causality however accessing region A 1 cannot effect a state constructed from A 2 , and vice versa, so it would be possible to construct two copies of the quantum state. But this constitutes cloning, so no such protocol can exist.
To demonstrate sufficiency we construct an explicit protocol for completing any task satisfying the two conditions. To this end it is useful to introduce a directed graph G which describes the causal structure of the task: for each authorized region A i introduce a vertex, also labelled A i , to the graph. For each pair of regions (A i , A j ) such that there is a point in A j in the causal future of A i introduce a directed edge (A i → A j ). An example of a task and its associated graph is given as figure 4 .
From the no-cloning theorem it follows that some information must be shared between every pair of authorized regions. Thus, our protocol must involve at least one share for each edge (A i → A j ). We show in figure 3 that whenever two regions A i , A j share a causal connection it is possible to localize a quantum state to both of them. To complete the task then, our error-correcting code should have the property that, given any vertex, the set of shares associated to the edges attached to that vertex are sufficient to construct the state.
In fact, given that every pair of vertices in this graph share an edge, which is guaranteed by condition (ii), such error-correcting codes have already been constructed. To encode finite-dimensional quantum systems we constructed such codes using the codeword-stabilized formalism in the context of a similar summoning problem [6] , where we found codes using two qubits for each edge in G. Constructions for continuous variable systems have also been given [8] and then adapted to the finite-dimensional case in [22] . This result is particularly simple and expected from earlier work on summoning. Indeed, the conditions for summoning to a collection of diamonds [6] are the same as for localizing to a collection of authorized regions.
Localizing and excluding quantum information
Now that we have an understanding of when and how a single quantum state can be localized to many spacetime regions, we can approach the localize-exclude task. This task includes a notion of unauthorized region, a region in spacetime which we must ensure does not have the state localized to it in the sense described in the last section. Further, we will require that accessing an unauthorized region reveals no information about the quantum state.
As a warm-up to the general case, consider the example given in the introduction as figure 1. There, a single unauthorized region blocks the path between two authorized ones. As we show in figure 5, it is nonetheless possible to complete the task using the quantum Figure 4 : An example of a task with three authorized regions A 1 , A 2 and A 3 . (a) The arrangement of the regions in spacetime, notice that each region consists of two disconnected ball-shaped regions. (b) The corresponding graph of causal connections, used in the proof of theorem 3 to construct the error-correcting code needed to complete the task.
one-time pad [23] . Near the start point, a unitary U k is applied to |ψ with k chosen at random. Then the encoded state U k |ψ is sent through both authorized regions by allowing it to pass through the unauthorized region. The classical key k is also sent to both authorized regions, but along trajectories that avoid the unauthorized one. A similar technique can be applied to the general case of many authorized and many unauthorized regions. As we show in the proof of theorem 4 given below, the strategy is to first encode the state into an error-correcting code so that it can be localized to each authorized region. Then each share in that error-correcting code is encoded using a classical string and the quantum one-time pad. We then leverage classical secret sharing to allow us to get the encoding string to the needed authorized regions while avoiding all the unauthorized regions.
We are now ready to state theorem 4 and give the proof. The proof of sufficiency is somewhat lengthy, so we have provided figure 6 which summarizes the key steps taken. Proof. The necessity of conditions (i)(a) and (ii) follow from the same arguments as in theorem 3. To argue the necessity of condition (iii), notice that if A i is contained in the domain of dependence of U j , then the state of the quantum fields within A j is determined by unitary evolution from the fields within U i . Then whenever the state can be determined Figure 5 : Illustration of the protocol for completing a localize-exclude task with two authorized regions and one unauthorized region that satisfies the conditions of theorem 4. In the distant past, Alice prepares copies of the classical string k. She brings one copy of k to each of A 1 and A 2 along a path which does not cross U -this is always possible by condition (iii). She must also bring the classical string to the start point s, and encode the state |ψ using the quantum one-time pad [23] . The encoded state U k |ψ is sent to both authorized regions. Following this protocol both authorized regions contain k and U k |ψ , while the authorized region contains U k |ψ only. from A i it is also possible to determine it from U j . Condition (i)(b) is necessary for the same reason.
To demonstrate sufficiency we construct an explicit protocol to complete the task in the case where all three conditions are true. It is useful to introduce the notation (ρ, s, {A 1 , ..., A n }, {U 1 , ..., U m }), which describes a localize-exclude task by specifying the state (or system) on which we must complete the task, the start point, authorized regions, and unauthorized regions. As a first step in constructing our protocol, we encode the state ρ into the error-correcting code used in theorem 3. Using this code and localizing each share in the code to its two associated authorized regions would localize the state to each authorized region. However, here we also need to exclude the state from all of the unauthorized regions. To do this, we will localize each share S ij to A i and A j while also avoiding every unauthorized region. In other words, encoding ρ into the codeword stabilized code reduces completing the
One-time pad ((m, m)) classical secret sharing scheme Figure 6 : Diagram of the sufficiency proof of theorem 4. In three steps, the proof reduces completing the localization task on the state ρ with n authorized sets and m unauthorized sets, denoted by (ρ, s,
where the region R i may be either the start point or an authorized region and the notation −∞ indicates the share is available at early times. The first step in the protocol is to recycle the error-correcting code from theorem 3 to encode the state into shares S ij . At the second step, the one-time pad is applied to each of the S ij . This allows the unauthorized regions to be avoided by introducing additional classical shares, but without the need for further uses of quantum error-correcting codes.
original task to completing the tasks (S ij , s, {A i , A j }, {U 1 , ..., U m }) for every share S ij .
By using the quantum one-time pad and classical secret sharing it is possible to further reduce completing the (S ij , s, {A i , A j }, {U 1 , ..., U m }) task. In particular, at s use the quantum one-time pad to encode the share S ij using some classical string k ij . We may freely send the encoded share through A i and A j so long as the classical string k ij is kept out of all of the unauthorized regions, and is made available at s, A i , and A j . Thus, the task (S ij , s,
To finish the protocol, we first notice that theorem 3 shows that we can complete any task of the form (S ij , s, {A i , A j }, ∅) given that conditions (i)(a) and (ii) hold. The task
is also easily handled. Note that since the task is to be completed on a classical string, we can produce three copies of K ij and worry separately about sending the state to s and each of A i and A j , so we have to complete three instances of (k ij , −∞, R, {U 1 , ..., U m }), where R can be s, A i or A j . To complete these, encode k ij into an ((m, m)) secret sharing scheme with shares k l ij . Then complete the tasks (k l ij , −∞, R, U l ). This completes the task with all m unauthorized regions since the classical string is kept out of U l so long as at least one of the shares in the ((m, m)) scheme is.
It remains to complete the tasks of the form (k l ij , −∞, R, U l ). When R is one of the authorized sets, condition (iii) guarantees that R is not in the domain of dependence of U l , which means there is a causal curve passing through R which does not enter U l . To complete the task, simply send k l ij along this curve. When R is the start point s, condition (i)(b) guarantees there is a causal curve passing through s and not U l , so again we can complete this task.
Earlier we mentioned the similarity of conditions (ii) and (iii) to corresponding conditions for quantum secret sharing. A quantum secret sharing scheme [21] is specified by an access structure, with the access structure consisting of subsets of parties deemed authorized and subsets deemed unauthorized. A quantum secret sharing scheme can be constructed under two conditions [21] : (a) (no-cloning) no two authorized sets can be disjoint and (b) (monotonicity) no authorized set can be contained within an unauthorized set. Conditions (ii) and (iii) of the localize-exclude theorem are exactly these conditions rephrased in a context appropriate to spacetime.
Beyond this similarity, we can embed any secret sharing scheme into a localize-exclude task. Consider n parties, Bob 1 ,...,Bob n , who each can potentially access an associated spacetime region Σ i . Take the authorized and unauthorized regions to consist of unions of Σ i 's, so that a full authorized region A i can be accessed only if some collection of Bobs agree to cooperate. Next, choose the regions Σ i to be all spacelike separated. Then condition (ii) of theorem 4, which requires causal connections between authorized sets, reduces to the requirement that every pair of authorized regions share at least one Σ i . This is exactly the nocloning requirement on secret sharing. Further, condition (iii) reduces to no U i = {Σ i1 , ...Σ in } containing as a subset some A j = {Σ j1 , ..., Σ j2 } under the same restriction of having spacelike separated Σ i . Finally, to embed our quantum secret sharing task into a localize-exclude task we should ensure that condition (i) becomes trivial, which we can do by sending the start point s to an early time.
Theorem 4 shows that completing a localize-exclude task with unauthorized regions requires only the same quantum error-correcting code as used in the case with no unauthorized sets. Hiding the state from the unauthorized regions can be accomplished using only the quantum one-time pad and classical secret sharing. This also provides a new approach to quantum secret sharing, since it shows that there is a universal quantum error-correcting code with 2 n 2 shares for n the number of authorized sets which, along with uses of the one-time pad and classical secret sharing, constructs quantum secret sharing schemes with arbitrary A ((k, n)) secret sharing scheme is one where any k of the n total shares can be used to reconstruct the secret while any k − 1 shares reveal nothing about the secret. Figure 7 : An example of a localize-exclude task and illustration of the protocol provided by theorem 4 for its completion. Near the start point the state |ψ is encoded as U k |ψ using the quantum one-time pad and sent (along the blue curve) through both authorized regions. The string k satisfies k = k 1 ⊕k 2 , so that k 1 , k 2 form the two shares of a ((2, 2)) secret sharing scheme. k 1 is sent through A 1 and A 2 while avoiding U 1 , while k 2 is sent through A 1 and A 2 while avoiding U 2 . Consequently, each A i contains all of the classical shares k i along with U k |ψ , while each U i is missing one k i . access structures. Using Shamir's method [24] , the 3m n 2 instances of the ((m, m)) secret sharing scheme will each require O(m log m) bits, where m was the number of unauthorized sets. In total, O(n 2 ) qubits and O(m 2 n 2 log m) classical bits are used in the construction. This provides the first efficient construction of quantum secret sharing schemes using a polynomial number of qubits. Previously, efficient constructions were known for threshold schemes and certain other special access structures. (See, e.g. [25, 26, 27] .) Since the number of unauthorized sets can grow exponentially with n, the classical bits used can be exponentially large. This is to be expected since it is conjectured to be impossible to construct classical secret sharing schemes for arbitrary access structures without consuming exponential resources [28] .
State-assembly
State-assembly with authorized regions
Rather than have Bob be able to access Alice's labs over certain time intervals, we could instead have Bob request the state from Alice at certain sets of spacetime points. In this state-assembly task Alice's goal is to hand over quantum systems and classical instructions sufficient to construct exactly one copy of the state when the collection of requests she receives corresponds to an authorized region, and to not reveal anything about the state when the collection of requests is unauthorized. We have in mind the situation where the state held by Alice is known by her, although the theorems given below remain true when the state is unknown. As we discuss in Appendix A, the condition that Alice hand the state over exactly once means knowing the quantum state does not give Alice any extra power. ¶ To define an assembly task, we specify a collection of pairs of points (c i , r i ). Each pair of points is controlled by some party, call him Bob i . The point c i is a call point; Bob i broadcasts a single bit b i ∈ {0, 1} from c i . Alice may choose to hand to Bob i a quantum system along with some classical instructions at the corresponding return point r i . Each possible set of calls {b 1 , b 2 , ...b n } is assigned the label authorized or unauthorized. To successfully complete the task Alice should hand over, at the called to return points, a set of quantum systems and classical instructions sufficient to reconstruct the state whenever the collection of calls is authorized. Similarly, she should reveal no information about the state when the set of calls is unauthorized.
It is convenient to use the pairs of points (c i , r i ) to define causal diamonds.
Definition 5
The causal diamond D i is defined as the intersection of the points in the past light cone of r i with those in the future light cone of c i .
The causal diamond represents the spacetime region in which it is possible to both know that a call was received, and to use this information to influence what is handed over at the ¶ State-assembly is substantially similar to summoning. The task defined here developed out of an attempt to generalize the summoning task, and we discuss the relation between these two tasks in Appendix A. s c 1 c 2 r 1 r 2
x t Figure 8 : A state-assembly task with two call-return pairs. A call to c 1 is required to result in the state returned at r 1 , and likewise for c 2 and r 2 (indicated by the black lines), while a call to both shouldn't result in more than one copy of the state being turned over. This task is impossible as shown by theorem 6, because r 2 is outside the future light cone of c 1 and r 1 is outside the future light cone of c 2 . In the language of definitions 5 and 2, c 1 and r 1 form a causal diamond D 1 (shown in blue), and the authorized set A 1 consists of the single diamond D 1 (similarly for c 2 and r 2 )).
corresponding return point. In the language of causal diamonds, the authorized sets of the assembly task consist of sets of diamonds, that is A i = {A i1 , ..., D in }. As explained below, successfully completing the assembly task relies crucially on the causal relationships between the diamonds in the task. Notice that two causal diamonds are causally connected (in the sense used in the last section) if and only if the return point of one diamond is in the future light cone of the call point of the other. Before discussing more general constructions we will begin with the simplest stateassembly task, illustrated in figure 8, and prove a no-assembly theorem. In this scenario there are two agents, Bob 1 and Bob 2 , who each control authorized sets A 1 and A 2 respectively. Theorem 6 Consider an assembly task with authorized sets A 1 and A 2 which are causally disconnected. Then this assembly task is impossible to complete with a perfect success rate.
Proof. Suppose that Alice has constructed a protocol which successfully completes the assembly task when a request is received at A 1 and not at A 2 , and when a request is received at A 2 but not at A 1 . Then since A 2 is causally disconnected from A 1 , a call at A 1 and A 2 must lead to copies of the state being handed over at each of A 1 and A 2 . Since the assembly task requires the state be handed over only once, Alice fails in this case.
We see that completing the assembly task to causally separated regions is impossible. Notice that it is essential that the Bobs may give calls to both diamonds. Although a call to A 1 ∪ A 2 is unspecified as authorized or unauthorized, the possibility of a call to A 1 ∪ A 2 along with the requirement that Alice allow assembly of not more than one copy of the state leads to Alice being unable to complete the task successfully. 
Next, we look at a wider class of assembly tasks involving an arbitrary number of diamonds. The task is specified by a collection of authorized sets {A i }. All remaining possible calls by the Bobs are left unspecified. Proof. To complete the assembly task Alice must localize the state to each region A i . This immediately gives necessity of these two conditions, since theorem 4 shows these are the necessary conditions for localization. Theorem 4 also gives sufficiency. There, we constructed an explicit protocol that localizes the state to each authorized region. In particular, the state is recorded as classical teleportation data and shares in a quantum error-correcting code. To complete the assembly task then Alice need only hand over the classical and quantum data in A i when she receives a call there.
State-assembly with authorized and unauthorized regions
We can now proceed to characterize the assembly tasks with both authorized and unauthorized sets that can be completed by Alice. The difficulty here for Alice is different than in the case of localize-exclude. There, she had to keep the state out of a region U i from an attacker who might gain full access to U i . Now, Alice's labs are secure, but the sets of spacetime points corresponding to an authorized call can be overlapping with those corresponding to an unauthorized call so that locally she may not be able to tell an authorized and unauthorized call apart.
To understand under what conditions Alice can avoid an accidental reveal of the state to an unauthorized region, we can first consider the simplest non-trivial case -a task of the form (ρ, s, A, U ) having one authorized and one unauthorized region. In this case, Alice can be successful if either (a) there is a diamond in A which is not in U , since then she can turn over the state at that diamond only when there is a call there or (b) there is a diamond D * in A which, although it is in U , is positioned such that Alice can tell at D * whether the global set of calls is authorized or unauthorized. In particular, this occurs exactly when there is a diamond in U \ A which is causally connected to A. Figure 9 illustrates these two possibilities.
We now state and prove the theorem characterizing the state-assembly tasks with authorized and unauthorized sets. (iii) Each pair (A a , U i ) of authorized with unauthorized sets has the property that either
Proof. The necessity of conditions one and two follow from the same arguments as in theorem 7. To see the necessity of the third condition, consider that its negation is that both A a ⊂ U i and U i \ A a is not causally connected to A a . Then Alice's agents in the diamonds of A a , should they receive calls, cannot distinguish a call to A a from a call to U i since they are causally disconnected from diamonds in U i \ A a . In order to complete the task, Alice must always hand the state over to A a when she receives a call there. She will then also always hand over the state when the call is to U i , leading to her failing the task.
To demonstrate sufficiency we construct an explicit protocol to complete the task in the case where all three conditions are true. Using the error-correcting code constructed from the graph of causal connections (also used in theorems 3, 4, and 7) we can reduce the initial (ρ, s, {A 1 , ..., A n }, {U 1 , ..., U m }) task to many tasks of the form (S ij , s,
where the S ij are the shares of the error-correcting code associated to the i−j pair of regions.
To complete the (S ij , s, {A i , A j }, {U 1 , ..., U m }) tasks, we encode the share S ij using the quantum one-time pad with some classical randomness k ij . Now notice that we can complete the (S ij , s, {A i , A j }, {U 1 , ..., U m }) task by completing (S ij , s, {A i , A j }, ∅) on the quantum share S ij and (k ij , s, A i , {U 1 , ..., U m }) and (k ij , s, A j , {U 1 , ..., U m }) on the classical string. Stated another way, the use of the one-time pad lets us ignore avoiding the unauthorized sets when considering the quantum data, and only worry about not handing the classical string over at the unauthorized sets. Figure 10 : An arrangement of causal diamonds on which we can define an assembly task. Define authorized sets A 1 = {D a,1 , D b,1 } and A 2 = {D a,2 , D b,2 } while any set of three or four diamonds is deemed unauthorized. One can check that every unauthorized set has U i \ A j causally connected to A j , so theorem 8 gives that this task can be completed. To do so, the initial state ρ is encoded using the quantum one-time pad and sent towards the pair of diamonds labelled 'a', D a1 and D a2 . It should be handed over at whichever diamond receives a call. The key k from the one-time pad is stored in a ((2, 2) ) secret sharing scheme as k = k a ⊕ k b and k a and k b are sent towards the 'a' and 'b' pairs of diamonds respectively. At the 'a' pair of diamonds, k a is returned to D a1 if there is a call there and no call at D a2 , or at D a2 if there is a call there and no call at D a1 . The k b string is returned to D b1 or D b2 using the same logic. If three or four diamonds receive calls, then at least one of the 'a' or 'b' pairs of diamonds will not receive a share of the ((2, 2) ) scheme, so the state will not be revealed. Notice that the task is possible even though A 1 , A 2 are subsets of the unauthorized sets, violating the monotonicity requirement of quantum secret sharing.
To complete the tasks of the form (k ij , s, A i , {U 1 , ..., U m }), we encode k ij into a ((m, m)) classical secret sharing scheme with shares labelled k l ij . Then completing the tasks (k l ij , s, A i , U l ) ensures each share k l ij ends up at A i , so the string k ij can be constructed there along with the quantum share S ij . At the same time, completing the tasks (k l ij , s, A i , U l ) ensures the share k l ij is missing from U l , and since every share k l ij is needed to reconstruct the state, the state cannot be decoded there.
To complete these (k, s, A i , U j ) tasks, recall that by condition (iii) either A i \ U j is not empty or U i \ A i is causally connected to A i . If A i \ U i is not empty, then send k to a diamond D * in A i \ U i . Then hand over k at D * if there is a call there. If U i \ A i is causally connected to A i then send k to any diamond D * in A i which has at least one call point of U i \ A i in its causal past. Then hand over k at D * if there is a call there and no call at the diamonds in U j \ A i .
We give a task on four diamonds in figure 10 and demonstrate how to complete it using the protocol constructed in this proof. The state-assembly task seems a less natural extension of quantum secret sharing to spacetime, since condition (iii) differs notably from the corresponding condition in secret sharing. In particular, some allowed state-assembly tasks have unauthorized sets which contain authorized ones, violating the monotonicity requirement of quantum secret sharing [21] . In contrast, the localize-exclude task mimics the monotonicity requirement closely, since the condition there is that (the domain of dependence of) the unauthorized region not contain the authorized region. However, this distinction from secret sharing opens up interesting new possibilities; in the next section we propose a cryptographic task and protocol which exploit the failure of monotonicity in the state-assembly task.
An application: party-independent transfer
As discussed in the introduction, relativistic tasks in Minkowski space have provided an interesting set of tools for the cryptographer. In part, our motivation for considering the state-assembly task with authorized and unauthorized regions is in the hope it will find such application. The state-assembly task includes scenarios with many parties, and allows for a rich array of possible causal structures. Each causal structure translates to a set of restrictions on which parties can know what, and when, and it seems plausible that these restrictions can be exploited to perform some interesting multiparty task or computation securely.
We suspect there are many possible directions to consider, and make a small start at this by suggesting below one particular task. We do not offer complete security arguments for our proposal or careful discussion of the practicality of this task. Our aim is simply to suggest the applicability of the state-assembly task to cryptography.
To motivate the task consider the following scenario. Alice is an employer who wishes to hire either Bob 1 or Bob 2 . Alice is known to be inclined to prejudice, and the Bobs wish to ensure they are paid based on the work done alone, without regard to their identity. An easy solution would be to announce publicly the position's salary, but unfortunately the Bobs are private people. They wish to keep their salaries secret while also having a guarantee of fairness. We define the party-independent transfer task in order to satisfy these two competing needs.
In the party-independent transfer task, we specify that each Bob will give an output X i to Alice. Alice will then give an output σ(X 1 , X 2 , a) to one Bob, and ρ(X 1 , X 2 , a) to the other, where a is a variable fixed by Alice. The task occurs in a spacetime setting, so in general the X i may be stored as several bits handed over from Bob's agents to Alice's agents at distributed spacetime points. The X i should be distinct. If not, then the protocol aborts.
To meet the needs of our jealousy-prone but private Bobs, and guard against the prejudiced Alice, we need the transfer to have the following properties:
(i) Party independence: The outputs ρ and σ produced by Alice have the property that ρ(X 1 , X 2 , a) = σ(X 2 , X 1 , a) and ρ(X 2 , X 1 , a) = σ(X 1 , X 2 , a).
In words, we require that the output given to Bob 1 would have been given to Bob 2 had the Bobs reversed their inputs. (ii) Fixed: As a set, {ρ(X 1 , X 2 , a), σ(X 1 , X 2 , a)} is determined by the variable a only. In words, the Bobs' input influences who receives which state only, not which two states are handed over. (iii) Secret: Each Bob does not learn Alice's output to the other Bob. In particular, this requires that Alice not satisfy condition 1 trivially by having ρ(X 1 , X 2 , a) = σ(X 1 , X 2 , a) always.
To assure ourselves completing this task is not trivial consider various naive approaches. We might have Alice share two entangled sets of degrees of freedom, Σ given to Bob 1 and P given to Bob 2 , onto which she will later teleport σ and ρ, respectively. The Bobs could then exchange degrees of freedom if they decide to reverse the arrangement of who receives which state. This is certainly party-independent, since Alice performs the teleportation without knowing who holds which degrees of freedom. However, the fixed property is violated, as either Bob can act on their degrees of freedom before exchanging it.
Another strategy would be to have Alice publicly announce a protocol for preparing each of ρ and σ. Clearly this is fixed and party-independent, but fails to be secret. Finally, Alice could separately hand ρ to Bob 1 and σ to Bob 2 (or vice versa). This would be fixed and secret but not party-independent.
Although the obvious strategies fail, the state-assembly task seems to be well-suited to achieving party-independent transfer. As intuition, we can note that in a state-assembly task Alice's agents, who only have access to local information and not the global set of calls made by the Bobs, may not be aware of who has received the state until a late time when she has been able to collect and compare all of the call data. Further, we have already introduced the notion of an unauthorized set of calls and can hope to exploit this to achieve the secrecy property of party-independent transfer.
Indeed, we can put forward a candidate protocol built on a state-assembly task that seems to achieve all three security requirements of party-independent transfer. Before explaining the protocol however, we need to highlight one feature of the ((2, 3)) secret sharing scheme which will be used. We will use an error-correcting code on three physical qutrits which stores one logical qutrit. The logical states are given by
One may check explicitly that there exists a decoding operation U † 12 supported on the first two qutrits such that where
By the symmetry in the code, a similar decoding operation exists for any subsystems of two qutrits. We wish to highlight that after the decoding operation is applied, two of the qutrits are left in a maximally entangled state.
To construct the protocol, we will use the arrangement of diamonds shown in figure 11 . Bob 1 controls the diamonds D a,1 , D b,1 , D c,1 while Bob 2 controls D a,2 , D b,2 , D c,2 . We consider a scenario where the Bobs choose at random which of them receives which state, although modifications to this are easy. We divide the protocol into a preparation phase, transfer phase, and checking phase for clarity in presentation. (iii) Checking phase (a) Bob 1 applies the decoding map to his two shares, producing ρ ⊗ |χ where |χ is the maximally entangled state given in equation 4. (b) Bob 2 sends his share of the maximally entangled state to Bob 1 , who then measures the pair jointly to ensure he holds |χ .
In the notation of our security definition, the inputs X i by the Bobs consist of their three output bits
The state received by the Bobs is, before the checking phase, ρ = |ψ ψ| A ⊗ |χ χ| BC with one Bob holding the AB register and the other Bob holding C. After the checking phase however one Bob holds |ψ ψ| and the |χ χ| state has been measured. We should then identify the states ρ and σ of the definition as ρ = |ψ ψ| and σ = ∅. If we would like both Bobs to receive some quantum state we can run the protocol twice.
We can argue for the secret and fixed properties of this protocol. Fixed is clear, since the receiving Bob can reconstruct his state from degrees of freedom that have never been held by the non-receiving Bob. Regarding secrecy, we note that the non-receiving Bob receives only one share of the secret sharing scheme, so learns no information about ρ. The non-receiving Bob may try to receive additional shares by sending additional calls, but in this case Alice will notice that calls have been made at two causally related diamonds and not hand over any shares to those diamonds.
To argue for party-independence, note that Alice is already limited in her knowledge of who is receiving the state. Although at each pair of diamonds she knows whether she is handing a single share over to Bob 1 or Bob 2 , none of Alice's agents have the global information of which Bob is receiving two shares, and thus the state. Later on she will be able to collect information from all the call points and determine this, but at the spacetime points of transfer this is not known. Alice might try to have one set of shares which she hands to Bob 1 and a separate set to Bob 2 , but using two unentangled sets of shares for Bob 1 and Bob 2 will lead to a failure in the checking phase. We leave proving or disproving the security of this protocol, which we regard as plausible but not obvious, to future work.
It is perhaps useful to note a connection of classical bit commitment with the partyindependent transfer task. Given a bit commitment scheme which consists of 1) Alice handing a commitment to Bob, then 2) Alice later handing a reveal to Bob, which he uses to access Alice's committed bit it is possible to construct a party-independent transfer protocol. + In particular, Alice publicly announces her commitment to both Bob 1 and Bob 2 , then hands the reveal to only one of the Bobs. However, it is known that there are no unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes of this form [30, 31] .
Discussion
In our first article on summoning [6] , we argued that the summoning task gives an operational setting in which to understand how quantum information can and cannot move through spacetime. That setting had some limitations however, in that it was restricted to asking if a quantum state could be localized to collections of causal diamonds.
In this article we have generalized in a way that allows us to ask if a quantum state is localized to a collection of arbitrary spacetime regions. We've defined the notion of localized by allowing some party with no prior knowledge of the state unrestricted access to the spacetime region. If they can later construct the state then we say the state was localized there; if they learn nothing about the state we say it is excluded. This is consistent with our previous definition of localization to a diamond, in that completing the summoning task means in particular that the state was localized to each diamond. However, the notion of localization implied by summoning is stronger than the notion used in this article, since in summoning Alice must perform the data processing needed to construct the state while within the diamond. In the localize task this data processing can occur outside the region.
In the absence of gravity, where there are no known limits on the rate of computation, the strong and weak notions of localization coincide, at least for diamond-shaped regions.
In the presence of gravity Lloyd argued there is a limit on computational speed [32] but there are counterexamples to his proposed bound [33] . It is nonetheless plausible that computational speed is limited by quantum gravity, so one can imagine a scenario where the quantum state is localized to a region in the weaker sense (in that it is possible to construct the state from systems that pass through that region) but not in the strong sense (in that it is impossible to do so within the temporal extent of that region due to gravitational constraints on computation). Thus, in the presence of gravity these notions of localization likely become distinct. Attempts to resolve fundamental puzzles like the black hole information paradox [34, 12, 35] have also hinted at this distinction, and indicate that it may be the stronger notion of localization for which the no-cloning theorem applies.
Also in the context of gravity, the holographic bound [36] makes tasks with sufficiently small regions or sufficiently large numbers of regions impossible to complete, since it places a limit on how many qubits may be localized to a region of a given area without producing a black hole. Thus, we should understand the theorems given in this work as applying only in the absence of gravity. It would be interesting to perform a detailed study of exceptions to our theorems arising from gravitational physics.
By adding excluded regions to the localize task we have found a natural extension of quantum secret sharing to a spacetime setting. Indeed, the conditions for completing the localize-exclude task have close analogues in the conditions for completing quantum secret sharing, and we can embed any quantum secret sharing scheme as a carefully chosen localize-exclude task. The conditions on the start point in the localize-exclude task are somewhat awkward from this perspective, but can be seen as corresponding to certain trivial requirements in the secret sharing language.
Since the localize-exclude task corresponds so closely to quantum secret sharing, we might expect that it doesn't provide any new tools for the construction of cryptographic protocols. From this perspective the state-assembly task is more interesting, since there we can have an unauthorized set contain an authorized one. This violates the monotonicity requirement that occurs in both localize-exclude and quantum secret sharing.
We have given one proposed application that exploits this violation of monotonicity: party-independent transfer. This proposal is in need of a more complete study. We have not proven our proposed protocol is secure, nor considered what more practical goals within cryptography this primitive may be used to achieve. It would also be interesting to understand the relation of the proposed party-independent transfer task to established cryptographic primitives. We have already pointed out a connection to bit commitment, but there may also be interesting relations to (for instance) the spacetime analogues of oblivious transfer mentioned in the introduction.
to how quantum information can move through spacetime; in this appendix we clarify the relationships among these three tasks.
Summoning, introduced by Kent [11] , can be viewed as a game played by two mistrustful parties, Alice and Bob. Bob prepares a quantum state ρ which he hands to Alice at a spacetime point, which we call s. There is a collection of points, {c i }, at which Bob will broadcast corresponding bits {b i }. These are associated with return points, {r i }. It is agreed that exactly one of the b i will have b i = 1, in which case we say the state has been summoned, and Alice is required to return the state ρ to the corresponding return point r i .
Completing the summoning task to a collection of diamonds {D i } also completes the localize task, with the diamonds of the summoning task becoming the authorized regions of the localize task. The reverse is not true however; completing the localize task implies some collection of systems inside each authorized region can be used to construct the state, but doesn't require that this reconstruction can take place within the region. For instance, exhibiting the state could require the application of a high complexity circuit, perhaps requiring so many gates that gravitational speed limits would prevent their completion in the required time.
The summoning task as given above is in particular single-call and single-return -it is single-call in that exactly one of the b i = 1 and it is single-return in that the state should be returned in full at the called-to diamond. We can generalize this to allow for Alice to receive many calls (many b i = 1) in two possible ways. First, we might specify that Alice return a subsystem at each called-to diamond such that taken together these subsystems can be used to reproduce the state. In this case we have weakened the requirement on Aliceshe need not hand over the state itself, just quantum information and classical instructions sufficient for Bob to later construct the state. We will refer to this as many-call many-return summoning. Alternatively, we can specify that Alice hand over the state itself at one (but any one) of the called-to diamonds. We call this many-call single-return summoning. This second case is treated by Adlam and Kent [7] and discussed further in Appendix B. The first case is closely related to the state-assembly task and we elaborate on this relation in the remainder of this section.
We can characterize the arrangements of diamonds for which the many-call many-return summoning task is possible in the following theorem.
Theorem 10 The many-call many-return summoning task is possible if and only if:
(i) The return point of at least one diamond from each authorized set is in the causal future of the start point.
(ii) Every pair of authorized sets (A i , A j ) is causally connected.
We omit the proof of this theorem as it proceeds along now familiar lines: the many authorized set case is reduced to a two set case by use of an error-correcting code, which can be constructed from the graph of causal connections among the regions. In the case of two authorized sets we use that the sets are causally connected, so in particular there exists a pair of causal diamonds chosen across the sets which are causally connected. We then complete Figure A1 : A summoning task on two diamonds in 2 + 1 dimensions. In this task r 1 is in the future light cone of c 2 , but r 2 is not in the future of c 1 . (In all figures, red arrows indicate causal curves.) Additionally, r 1 and r 2 are in the future light cone of s. To complete this summoning task, Alice pre-shares entanglement between s and c 1 . At s, Alice teleports the state ρ using the shared entanglement and then sends the classical teleportation data to both r 1 and r 2 . At c 1 , Alice routes the entangled particle she holds to r 1 if she receives b 1 = 1, and routes the particle to r 2 otherwise. This example is due to Kent [10] .
the summoning task on these two diamonds using the teleportation protocol illustrated in figure A1 . From theorems 7 and 10 we find that state-assembly and summoning are possible for exactly the same arrangements of authorized regions. This is interesting, as although the tasks are similar, they have one key distinction. In summoning Alice holds an unknown quantum state, so can't produce copies of the state due to the linearity of quantum mechanics; in state-assembly Alice holds a known quantum state, but has the additional requirement that she hand over the state at most once. Thus, in the assembly task the requirement that Alice hand the state over at most once replaces the no-cloning restriction. The state Alice holds is essentially classical, since it is known to her and she may produce an arbitrary number of copies, but this gives her no additional power. In this sense we can view the state-assembly task as a classical analogue of the summoning task * .
In the main article we discussed the state-assembly task with unauthorized regions. One could also consider a generalization of the summoning task with unauthorized regions, but this generalization is less well motivated. In particular, in the summoning task Bob both gives the state to Alice and requests it from her. It is unclear in what circumstance Alice would want to hide the state Bob gave to her from Bob when certain sets of calls are made. In the assembly setting this is more natural, since Alice has herself prepared the state and may want to hide it from certain subsets of other parties. Figure B1 : The three diamond task described in text. The known protocol for completing this task makes use of quantum error-correction: The state is encoded into a ((2, 3)) secret sharing scheme with one share sent to each of the call points c i . The shares are then routed to r i+1 mod 3 if b i = 0, and to r i if b i = 1. This task is the simplest example of a summoning task which Alice can complete if there is a guarantee Bob will make only one call, but not if Bob may make an arbitrary number of calls.
any one diamond can gather both these shares from the secret sharing scheme and later use them to construct the state. Thus, in this sense the state is localized to all three diamonds. When Bob sends a call, however, he may prevent the state from being reproduced in certain diamonds. This is obvious in a more prosaic example: Suppose we have two diamonds, with a diamond D 2 far in the causal future of the diamond D 1 . Then Bob giving a call to D 1 results in Alice handing the state over to Bob there, and so she does not produce the state in diamond D 2 . One thing that is interesting about the three diamond task, as revealed by Adlam and Kent, is that in some cases Bob's calls can prevent the state from being reproduced in any diamond. In particular this can happen in cases with cyclic connections among diamonds, as in the three diamond task.
